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NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT IN 
 THE NEW WORLD ORDER
Mitsuru Kurosawa*
  With the end of the Cold War era, international society has changed ramatically, 
and the situation surrounding the international security order has experienced a
decisive transformation. Firstly, although the danger of the outbreak of world-wide 
nuclear war had been a constant threat, the international order based on the confron-
tation between the East and the West, especially between the United States and the 
Soviet Union, had kept international peace by pursuing the stability of East-West 
relations. With the disappearance of the confrontation between the East and the West, 
there emerge conflicts caused by regional, in particular ethnic and religions, différences 
in various areas of the globe. 
  Secondly, the central problem of arms control and disarmament in the Cold War 
era had been on nuclear weapons possessed by the two superpowers, and the negotia-
tions have been conducted between these two states. In the post-Cold War era, the focus 
of arms control and disarmament has moved from nuclear disarmament to non-
prolifération of weapons of mass destruction and missiles, and the effort has shifted to 
prevent he third-world countries from obtaining these weapons. 
  Thirdly, the United Nations which had been dormant during the Cold War days and 
had not exercised its functions provided for in the Charter because of the frequent use 
of veto powers by the permanent members, has began to revive itself as an efficient 
international organization. As we have seen in the field of peace keeping operations 
and collective enforcement actions in recent years, the fundamental function of main-
taining international peace and security by the United Nations has been recovered in 
part in the post-Cold War era. 
  The international security order which has developed based on these new 
phenomenon, however, is still transitionary and it can not be said that the new 
international order has been established. This paper will discuss the development of 
an aspect of the new international security order which consists of many components;
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nuclear arms control and disarmament. First, I will try to examine the international 
security order in the Cold War era, the concept of arms control, and the military and 
political role of nuclear weapons during that period. Secondly, I will deal with the 
post-Cold War era, and ask how the international security environnent has changed, 
the kind of measures that have been taken or should be taken in the field of nuclear 
disarmament, and the role of nuclear weapons. In conclusion, I will show what a new 
international security order in the era following the post-Cold War era should be.
I The International Security Order in the Cold War Era
i) Arms Race by "Arms Control" 
  The fundamental international order in the Cold War era consisted of the East-West 
confrontation and military and ideological rivalry between the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), the leaders of 
which were the United States and the Soviet Union respectively. The United Nations, 
which had been rendered largely ineffective by the veto powers of the two superpowers 
since its inauguration, could not be responsible for the urgent problems of international 
peace and security. Negotiations on arms control and disarmament also had been 
conducted mainly outside of the United Nations. In the Cold War days, the fundamental 
relationship had been confrontational with sporadic political détente, and resulted in 
the spiraling arms race. 
  The effort to tryto mitigate the continuing arms race was the adoption of the concept 
of "arms control", which was the leading security policy of the Lime. The concept of 
"arms control" starts from the presumption that it is impossible to try to reduce and 
eliminate armaments as a realistic political option, and in those circumstances purports 
(i) to reduce the probability of an outbreak of nuclear war, (ii) to reduce the sacrifice 
should a nuclear war occur, and (iii) to reduce the cost of military preparation.11 
  "Arms Control" hardly includes measures to reduce armaments, and pursues the 
goal of securing "strategic stability" between the East and the West, in particular 
between the United States and the Soviet Union. As a result, this sometimes includes 
measures to permit the increase of armaments. In order to reduce the danger of the 
outbreak of nuclear war, "arms control" is mainly concemed with "crisis stability" and 
"arms race stability". Under the concept of "arms control", the superpowers supported
1) For the fundamental concept of "arms control", see Hedley Bull, The Control of Arma Race, Weidenfeld 
   and Nicolson, London, 1961; Donald G.Brennan, "Setting and Goals of Arms Control, " in DonaldG.Brennan 
   (ed.), Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Securiiy, George Braziller, N.Y., 1961, pp. 19-42.
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a "theory of deterrence based on "mutual assured estruction (MAD)", a situation 
which purported to prevent nuclear war from occurring by maintaining an enormous 
second strike capability in the event of a nuclear attack.2) 
  However, the real arms race between the two countries has not been necessarily 
regulated by the above-mentioned purpose or theories. The Strategic Arms Limitation 
Talks (SALT) have begun since 1969, and they concluded the Anti-Ballistic Missile 
(ABM) Treaty and the Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT I 
Interim Agreement) in 1972, and the Treaty on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms 
(SALT II Treaty) in 1979. The ABM Treaty which limits their strategic defensive arms 
is in line with the MAD theory which requires keeping cities vulnerable to the second 
strikes. In the 1980s, however, President Reagan launched the Strategic Defense 
Initiative (SDI) which examined the possibility of deploying a strategic defense 
network, which would undermine the ABM Treaty. 
  International regulation of strategic offensive arms did not include the reduction of 
arms, but purported principally to keep the status quo and permitted the new expansion 
of arms in some areas. Their main purpose was to keep the arms race within a wide 
framework in order that the future arms race would not become uncontrollable. The 
SALT I Interim Agreement stipulates that there shah be no deployment of new 
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles 
(SLBMs) and modem submarines, and the SALT II Treaty provides for a freeze of the 
total number of nuclear arms, including bombers as well as missiles, and sets sub-limits 
for special arms. The sub-limit, however, permits further increases of ICBMs with 
MIRVs (multiple independently targetable r entry vehicles) and SLBMs with MIRVs, 
which means the Treaty permits further development and deployment of sophisticated 
modem weapon systems. 
  These regulations were mainly concerned with the number of the nuclear-weapon 
delivery systems, that is, missiles and bombers, and did not regulate the number of 
nuclear warheads. Accordingly, the number of warheads increased tremendously, in 
one case by ten times, by deploying MIRVs. Furthermore, since these regulations were 
not concerned with the qualitative development ofarms, they were free to develop and 
deploy qualitatively improved weapon systems.
ii) The Role of Nuclear Weapons
2) N.J. Rengger analyzes that the arms control in the Cold War has been largely a "great power concern", and 
   it subordinated the interests of "international society" to that of particular members of it (Rengger, "Arms 
   Control, International Society, and the End of the Cold War,"Arms Control, Vol.13, No.1, April 1992,p.41.).
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  It is necessary to examine that kind of role nuclear weapons had in the Cold War 
era from a military and political point of view. Militarily, in the western countries 
nuclear weapons were thought o be used as second strikes and to be useful to deter 
an attack by enemies due to the threat of massive retaliation. The principal strategy in 
those days was "flexible response strategy", which means to respond flexibly in 
accordance with an enemy's attack, and Western countries were ready to escalate from 
defense by conventional weapons ultimately to the use of strategic nuclear weapons. 
The strategy presupposed the use of nuclear weapons first against an attack by 
conventional weapons only, and precluded the concept of "no-first-use" of nuclear 
weapons. 
  In discussions on negative security assurances, that is, no-use of nuclear weapons 
against non-nuclear-weapons states (NNWSs), the United States did not exclude the 
possibility of the use of nuclear weapons against NNWS (e.g. East Germany) allied 
with nuclear-weapon states (NWSs) (e.g. Soviet Union), and the Soviet Union per-
mitted the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons against NNWSs on whose territory 
nuclear weapons are deployed (e.g. West Germany). In the Cold War era where 
confrontation of the two blocks was severe, both sides were ready to use nuclear 
weapons against an attack with conventional weapons, and nuclear weapons were 
generally thought o be usable in armed conflicts. 
  Accordingly, nuclear weapon systems were always under alarm condition and ready 
for use and bombers with nuclear weapons were always ready for taking-off. This alarm 
condition was necessary to convince enemies of the validity of nuclear deterrence 
theory, but it was prone to aggravate the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons by 
misjudgment, miscalculation, or accident. 
  In fact, nuclear weapons have never been used after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 
although the use of nuclear weapons has been considered by the United States in the 
cases of the Korean War and the Vietnam War. Neither in Europe where the East-West 
confrontation was most severe, nor during the Cuban missile crisis where the United 
States and the Soviet Union were on the brink of nuclear war were nuclear weapons 
ever used. You may explain these facts as cases where nuclear deterrence well worked. 
However, it is also possible to think that it was natural for political eaders to hesitate 
in using nuclear weapons because it would have lead to the destruction of the globe 
with its tremendous power. 
  Although nuclear weapons have never been used militarily since the end of the 
second world war, nuclear weapons have been ready for use any time, and the threat 
of the use of nuclear weapons has been hanging over people all over the world. 
  Now we move to the political role of nuclear weapons, and we will find out that
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they have played a very significant role. The NWSs, because of the possession of 
nuclear weapons, have shown themselves as big powers, and enjoyed privileged status 
in international society. The states which have developed and increased their nuclear 
weapons have been thought to be advanced and great powers because the development 
and increase of nuclear weapons need immense resources, ahigh level of technology 
and excellent scientists and technologists. The main motivation for nuclear weapons 
has been to bolster a nation's prestige or pride, as well as for better national security. 
  As the political role of nuclear weapons is a crucial factor in the motivation for 
nuclear prolifération, many more nations would have possessed nuclear weapons if 
there had not been any attempt to establish the non-prolifération regime. 
  Since 1971 when the People's Republic of China became a permanent member of 
the U.N. Security Council, the states which are permanent members and the states 
which possess nuclear weapons coincidentally have been the came. It means those who 
have nuclear weapons have veto power in the U.N. Security Council. This fact 
tremendously increased the political meaning of possessing nuclear weapons. The 
motivation of India which detonated "a peaceful nuclear device" in 1974 was to be the 
greatest power in the region, as well as to mitigate security concems in connection 
with China. The nuclear development race between Argentina nd Brazil was also to 
take hegemony in the region. 
  The Nuclear Non-Prolifération Treaty (NPT) prohibits the acquisition of nuclear 
weapons by the NNWSs, but does not regulate further nuclear development by the 
NWSs. Under the NPT regime the NWSs have continued the qualitative and quantita-
tive development of their nuclear systems, which has resulted in highly valuing the 
possession of nuclear weapons as a national asset. In spite of the general feeling that 
the military use of nuclear weapons eems impossible because of their immense 
destructive power, the NWSs have been increasing their nuclear weapons because they 
have perceived nuclear weapons to be very useful as a political tool in international 
politics.
II International Security in the Post-Cold War Era
i) Nuclear Reduction and Prolifération Danger 
  From the end of 1980s to the beginning of 1990s, the international system fun-
damentally based on the East-West rivalry for 40 years has collapsed and we have 
entered a new era after the Cold War era. The process began with Gorbachev's 
perestroika nd glasnost policies, leading to revolution of the Soviet social system, 
democratization of Eastern Europe, the unification of East and West Germanies,
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dismantlement of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, and at last the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. The remarkable character of arms control and disarmament during this time 
has been the process of substantive nuclear reduction by the United States and the 
Soviet Union or the Russian Federation on one hand, and the increase of the danger of 
prolifération ot only of nuclear weapons but also of other weapons of mass destruction 
and missiles on the other hand, and the shirting of international efforts for amis control 
and disarmament from the former to the latter. 3) 
  Although the process of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) had began 
in 1982, we had to wait until the end of the Cold War in order to arrive at the conclusion 
of the START Treaty. At the summit in Malta in December 1989, Presidents Bush and 
Gorbachev proclaimed the end of the Cold War and confirmed the transition from the 
days of confrontation to the new era of cooperation. In July 1991, they concluded the 
START I Treaty, agreeing to the substantial reduction of strategic nuclear weapons of 
both countries which could not have been even imagined uring the Cold War era. The 
Treaty provides for the reduction of their nuclear warheads to 6000 each, meaning the 
reduction by one third of their 11000 to 12000 nuclear warheads through complex 
counting rules. 
  Theycontinued negotiations and in January 1993 the United States and the Russian 
Federation signed the START II Treaty agreeing to the further reduction of nuclear 
warheads to 3000-3500 by 2003, and to the total elimination of ICBMs with MIRVs. 
With the START I and II Treaties, they agreed to the substantive r duction of strategic 
nuclear forces, eliminating the confrontation based on strategic nuclear forces as a 
symbol of East-West confrontation, and leading to the complete demise of the Cold 
War structure. With these measures, the focus of arms control and disarmament have 
shifted to non-prolifération. 
  The conclusion of two START Treaties does not mean the total resolution of the 
strategic nuclear forces issue. The entry into force of the START II Treaty presupposes 
the entry into force of the START I Treaty. After the signature but before the ratification 
of the START I Treaty, the Soviet Union as a nation has disappeared inDecember 1991. 
Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Byelarus as well as Russia and the United States have signed 
the Protocol to the Treaty, because the former Soviet nuclear weapons have been 
deployed in those new countries. In spite of the fact that for the START I Treaty to 
enter into force, the ratification of the Protocol by the Pive countries is necessary, 
Ukraine's position is not clear so far and demands ome measures to strengthen their
3) Ronald F. Lehman II, "Arms Control: Passing the Torchas Time Runs Out," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 16, 
   No.3, Sommet 1993, p.42.
1994] NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER 13
security and economic assistance. The United States, the Russian Federation a d other 
western countries should respond positively to their demands inorder to secure the 
Treaty's entry into force and its implementation 4~ 
  In spite of the welcome nding of the ColdWar, the disappearance of the U.S.-
Soviet world hegemony brought many regional conflicts to the surface. The first case 
was the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. After the end of the so-called Gulf War, the United 
Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agen-
cy (IAEA) conducted on-site inspections in accordance with Security Council Resolu-
tion 687, and found out that Iraq had been developing clandestine uclear weapons 
programs. This fact gave a big shock to the NPT regime because Iraq had been 
subjected toIAEA inspections a a party to the NPT and the IAEA reported no problem 
with Iraq. 
  As the demise of the Cold War brought the demise of the Soviet Union with it, in 
the former Soviet Union there merged the serious problem of the danger of nuclear 
prolifération i addition to the above-mentioned implementation problem of the 
START I Treaty. While strategic nuclear arms till remain in four new states, tactical 
nuclear weapons have already been withdrawn i to Russian territory. Because of the 
collapse of the Soviet Union which had kept monolithic control over nuclear weapons, 
physical protection ofthe nuclear weapons which are deployed inor withdrawn tothe 
Russian Federation is not quite enough, and many fear that hey may fall into the 
possession f unauthorized persons or smuggled toother countries. There are also deep 
concerns about he control of plutonium and highly-enriched uranium which will be 
taken out of dismantled nuclear weapons. An additional concern isthe many nuclear 
scientists and technologists who lost their jobs, and we can not deny the possibility 
that hey may be employed by third-world countries which are eager to develop nuclear 
weapons. The program to establish international science and technology centers in 
Moscow and Kiev to employ these scientists and technologiste is in active progress, 
but it seems that hey alone are not enough for this serious problem s> 
  North Korea, which had agreed to accept the IAEA safeguards after 7 years refusai,
4)
5)
For Ukrainian uclear probletns, ee John F. Mearsheimer, "'Me Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent," 
Foreign Affairs, Vol.72, No.3, Summer 1993, pp.50-66; Steve Miller, "The Case against aUkrainian Nuclear 
Deterrent," Ibid, pp.67-80. 
For nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union, see Ivo H. Daalder and Teny Terriff, "Nuclear Arias 
Control: Finishing the Cold War Agenda," Arias Control, Vol.14, No.1, April 1993, pp.5-37; Steve Miller, 
"Western Diplomacy and the Soviet Nuclear Legacy," Survival, Vol.34, No.3, Autumn 1992, pp.3-27; 
Spurgeon M.Keeny, Jr., et al., "Nuclear Weapons in the Former Soviet Union," Arias Control Today, Vol.23, 
No.1, January/February 1992, pp.3-37.
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announced its desire to withdraw from the Treaty in March 1993. As North Korea 
refused demands by the IAEA for special inspections of the two facilities in Yonbyon, 
some countries including the United States want to apply U.N. sanctions against North 
Korea. The case in which a state which is isolated in international society is developing 
a nuclear weapons program, shows how deep and serious the problem of non-proliféra-
tion in the post-Cold War era is. 
  In South Asia, India and Pakistan are refusing to join the NPT and are continuing 
their nuclear and missile programs. Both countries own nuclear facilities not under the 
IAEA safeguards, and are producing nuclear materials indigenously. 
  In the Middle East, Israel has been believed to possess many nuclear weapons, and 
chemical weapons were used during the Iran-Iraq War in 1980s. The use of chemical 
weapons by Iraq against Israel was feared during the Gulf War in 1991. Although the 
Chemical Weapons Convention was signed by more than 130 states in January 1993, 
many Arab countries refuse to sign it as long as Israel possesses nuclear weapons. 
There are some concerns about he intentions of Iran, Libya and Algeria toward nuclear 
weapons development. 
  On the other hand, some measures which strengthened the NPT regime have been 
taken. South Africa, which has been one of the mort suspicious tates as to the 
development of nuclear weapons, acceded to the NPT in July 1991 and accepted the 
IAEA full-scope safeguards. Several states urrounding South Africa also acceded to 
the NPT and the security environment in southern Africa has been highly improved. 
In South America, Argentina nd Brazil, who were competing with each other's nuclear 
program for a long Lime without signing the NPT, changed their policies in 1990 and 
agreed to accept he IAEA full-scope safeguards. France and China, which had refused 
to join the NPT because it represented the superpower's world domination, joined the 
NPT in 1992. 
  It was in this international scene that President Bush announced his "Non-Prolifera-
tion Initiative" on July 13, 1992. It includes the U.S. decision ot to produce plutonium 
or highly-enriched uranium for nuclear explosive purposes. The U.S.will also focus 
special efforts on those areas where the dangers of prolifération remain acute, notably 
in the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, South Asia, and the Korean peninsula. This policy 
emphasizes the compliance with and enforcement of international non-prolifération 
norms, support for special inspections, harmonization ofexport controls, and regional 
efforts for non-prolifération. In addition, the conclusion of the Chemical Weapons 
Convention, and strengthening of the NPT, the Tlatelolco Treaty, the IAEA, the 
Biological Weapons Convention and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) 
are mentioned.
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ii) The NPT Extension Conférence and Nuclear Disarmament 
  The most important conférence on arms control and disarmament during the 
post-Cold War era will be the NPT extension conférence which will be held in 
April/May 1995 in New York. At the conférence the participants will decide whether 
to extend the NPT indefinitely or for an additional fixed period or periods by a majority 
vote. The fifth NPT review conférence will be held at the saure time. At the last four 
review conférences, the progress of nuclear disarmament was the mort controversial 
issue and NNWSs criticized the discriminatory character of the NPT. Although with 
some progress in nuclear eduction in the post-Cold War era the discrimination i  the 
Treaty seems to be somewhat reduced, the following measures should be taken in order 
to proceed from the post-Cold War era toward establishing a new international security 
order.
  (a) Implementing the START Treaties 
  The United States and the Soviet Union or the Russian Federation have agreed to 
substantially reduce their nuclear arsenals, but neither Treaty has yet entered into force. 
Although both countries are partially implementing their obligations by putting their 
nuclear weapons off-alert or dismantling some systems, their complete implementation 
can not be secured without the ratification of the Treaties. As the ratification of the 
Protocol to the START I Treaty by Ukraine is crucial for implementing the Treaties, 
states concerned should take various measures which would motivate Ukraine to ratify. 
In Russia, nome measures are also necessary to get support domestically for their 
smooth implementation. 
  More difficult will be the Russian nuclear dismantlement work, because Russia 
does not have enough technical and financial means to implement i s promise of deep 
reductions. Ibis means the obligation assumed by Russia can not be implemented 
without help from foreign countries. The United States has already started a coopera-
tive denuclearization process under Nunn-Lugar legislation and other G-7 countries 
are also providing technical and financial assistance. The sooner the dismantlement 
work proceeds, the fewer the opportunities for the unauthorized seizure of nuclear 
weapons by terrorists or others and the safer the world will be. Stringent control over 
the nuclear materials derived from dismantled nuclear weapons is needed, and an 
international control system over plutonium would be necessary.
  (b) Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) 
  A comprehensive ban on nuclear testing, as provided for in the preamble of the 
NPT, is an effective measure to stop the qualitative nuclear race, mitigating the
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discriminatory nature of the Treaty. For this reason the highest priority has been given 
to a CTB in disarmament measures. As in the Cold War era, the SALT Agreements did 
not regulate qualitative aspect of the arms race, the NWSs have continued improving 
the quality of their armaments, which have required the conduct of testings. The United 
States expressed as their policy a "step-by-step approach", seeing a CTB as an ideal 
but making no significant progress in that direction. 
  In spite of the advent of the end of the Cold War which meant there was no longer 
a necessity to compete with the Soviet Union, the Bush Administration was very 
reluctant to negotiate a CTB. After the U.S. House of Representatives approved a 
one-year moratorium on testing, the U.S. Senate in August 1992 passed draft legislation 
which stipulates a nine-month moratorium, 15 tests in the following three years and a 
complete ban after that. This draft legislation became law in October. The new Clinton 
Administration has examined the problems of whether to resume testing after the 
moratorium, and whether to continue small-scale testing after 1996 as nuclear 
laboratories demand. On July 2, 1993, President Clinton announced the continuation 
of the moratorium and urged other NWSs to follow, and France and Russia announced 
their willingness to continue the moratorium.6) 
  Under these circumstances, the moue toward a CTB has been made and the Geneva 
Conférence on Disarmament, on August 10, unanimously gave the mandate to 
negotiate a CTB to the ad hoc Committee on Nuclear Test Ban. Substantive negotiation 
will start from January 1994. We can be optimistic of its progress because the decision 
was supported by all NWSs, although China conducted a nuclear test in October. 
  The main reason why the United States changed their position from reluctance to 
support is the recognition by the Administration that a CTB is indispensable for 
effective non-prolifération and for getting maximum support for an indefinite exten-
sion of the NPT in 1995. From this point of view, it is urgent to sign a CTB treaty or 
to agree on the fundamental structure of the treaty before the extension conférence. 7)
(c) Production Cut-Off of Nuclear Materials for Weapons Purposes 
In its non-prolifération initiative of July 1992, the United States announced the
6)
7)
For the reasons not to resume nuclear testing, see "Nuclear Explosive Testing: The 8 Reasons Not to Resume 
Testing," The Defense Monitor, Vol.22, No.5, 1993. 
James F. Leonard, Strengthening the Non-Prolifération Treaty in the Post-Cold War World, Washington 
Council on Non-Proliferation, October 1992, pp.6 and 10; Trever Findlay, A Comprehensive Nuclear Test 
Ban: Post-Cold War Prospects, Australian National University Research School of Pacifie Studies, Septem-
ber 1992, pp.10-12; Darryl Howlett and John Simpson, "The NPT and the CTB: Linkages, Options and 
Opportunities," Arms Control, Vol.13, No.1, Apri11992, pp.85-107.
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decision that the U.S. would not produce nuclear materials for weapons purposes. The 
U.S. explained that its intention for the decision was to encourage countries in regions 
of tension such as the Middle East and South Asia to take similar actions. As the nuclear 
arms race between the U.S. and Russia was over and the age of nuclear disarmament 
has corne, there is no need to produce nuclear materials for weapons purposes any 
more. 
   Accordingly, it is extremely urgent o start negotiations for a new treaty on the 
subject. Although some NWSs are still producing nuclear materials for weapons 
purposes, the necessity to increase nuclear forces has declined in the post-Cold War 
era. In order to persuade some countries not to develop a nuclear weapons program, it
is indispensable for the NWSs to stop producing these materials. This measure is a 
precondition to asking such states as Israel, India and Pakistan not to produce these 
materials.8) 
  On September 27, 1993, President Clinton proposed a multilateral convention 
prohibiting the production of highly-enriched uranium or plutonium for nuclear ex-
plosives purposes or outside of international safeguards.
  (d) Negative Security Assurances and No-First-Use 
  Negative security assurances which prohibit the use of nuclear weapons against the 
NNWSs parties to the NPT have been discussed since the time of treaty negotiation, 
but full assurances have not yet been given. Although at the U.N. Special Sessions on 
Disarmament in 1978 and 1982, all Pive NWSs proclaimed their intentions to provide 
negative security assurances, these were not good enough for NNWSs, because they 
were conditional, their forms were not uniforrn, and they were merely expressions of 
intention and not legally binding. These shortcomings depended on the confrontation 
between the East and the West based on the Cold War structure. Now that the Cold 
War is over, this reasoning has no validity today. 
  It seems natural for the NWSs to undertake a legally binding obligation not to use 
nuclear weapons against the NNWSs which voluntarily abandon the option of nuclear 
weapons and accept it as a legally binding obligation by acceding to the NPT or other 
treaty establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs). More complete negative 
security assurances will be a big incentive for non-parties to the NPT to accede to it 9)
8)
9)
Rufus H. Shumate and Lewis A. Dunn, "Nuclear Material Arms Control: Reassessment Continues," inLewis 
A. Dunn and Sharon A.Squassoni (eds.), Arms Control: What Next? Westview Press, 1993, pp. 123-124. 
For security assurances to NNWSs, see George Dunn, Security Assurances for Non-Nuclear-Weapon States 
as a Part of the 1995 Bargain to Extend the Non-Prolifération Treaty, Lawyers Alliance for World Security, 
February 1993.
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  The NWSs should take one step more to proclaim a no-first-use policy and begin 
negotiations for a treaty on no-first-use of nuclear weapons,10) because the doctrine of 
extended deterrence has lost its raison d'être by the improvement of the East-West 
relationship, the democratization of Eastern Europe, and the dissolution of the WTO. 
The need to complement he inferiority in conventional weapons with nuclear weapons 
has disappeared with the conclusion and implementation of the Conventional Forces 
in Europe (CFE) Treaty. Also, as tactical weapons in Central Europe have already been 
withdrawn, the physical base for the doctrine seems to have disappeared. As the 
theoretical and physical support of the doctrine has broken down, the NWSs should 
take a no-first-use policy. 
  The no-first-use of nuclear weapons does not prohibit the use of nuclear weapons 
as retaliation against an enemy's first use of nuclear weapons. However, it is the first 
and indispensable measure necessary for the eventual complete prohibition of the use 
of nuclear weapons.
  (e) Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Regional Security 
  NWFZs which provide for the "complete absence of nuclear weapons" in a region, 
is complementary to non-prolifération. The participation of Brazil, Argentina nd Chile 
in the near future to the Tlatelolco Treaty in Latin America would make the Treaty 
complete. If the United States, the United Kingdom and France change their mind and 
sign the Protocol 2 of the Rarotonga Treaty of the South Pacific, the Treaty will be 
strengthened. 
  With the demise of the Cold War and the radical change in international circumstan-
ces, the possibility to establish new NWFZs has increased. In Africa, as South Africa 
acceded to the NPT, the attempt o establish a NWFZ since 1960 has become reality, 
and the OAU/UN group is now drafting a treaty establishing an African NWFZ which 
is expected to be signed in two years. In Southeast Asia, with the Cold War influence 
gone and increased stability in the region, the ASEAN conférence of foreign ministers, 
in July 1993, decided to begin drafting a treaty on a Southeast Asia NWFZ. On the 
Korean peninsula, although recent events do not permit us to be optimistic, the two 
Korean countries igned the Declaration of Denuclearization f the Korean Peninsula 
in December 1991.
10) Lewis A. Dunn and Frank W, Jenkins, "Nuclear Arms Control in the Post-Cold War World," in Lewis A. 
   Dunn and Sharon A. Squassoni (eds.), Arms Control: What Next? Westview Press, 1993, p.19; Jozef 
   Goldblat, "Issues Facing the 1995 NPT Extension Conférence," Security Dialogue, Vol.23, No.4, December 
   1992, p.30.
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  Positive support by NWSs is indispensable for NWFZs because otherwise it would 
be very difficult to establish them and even if they are established they would not be 
strong enough. Nevertheless, the initiative to establish a NWFZ must corne from the 
regional states concerned. With the demise of the Cold War favorable conditions have 
emerged for establishing NWFZs, and it is desirable to try to establish NWFZs in 
various regions in the world with the encouragement and support from the NWSs. 'Mis 
measure would strengthen the current NPT regime. 
  In the Middle East and South Asia conditions for NWFZs are not yet mature, though 
it would be hoped that these regions would be made free from nuclear weapons. In 
these regions, some measures should be taken to normalize their relations by compiling 
confidence-building measures such as the increase in transparency of military activities 
or the extension of communication links. In the Middle East, the peace process is 
progressing now between Israel and the PLO and Jordan. On these steps regional peace 
and security should be pursued. 
  In South Asia, India and Pakistan have concluded an agreement not to attack the 
nuclear facilities of the other. They should now agree not to deploy nuclear weapons 
or nuclear missiles, that is, to keep the status quo, and undertake not to threaten to use 
nuclear weapons. In this context it is also necessary for China to make some con-
fidence-building measures with India. India and Pakistan should build confidence in 
each other and resolve their différences such as the Kashimir problem, and try to 
establish a NWFZ. 
  As one of the most remarkable phenomena in the post-Cold War era is the increase 
of regional conflicts, it is urgent to strengthen regional security systems by positively 
taking various measures to build security and confidence among regional states.
iii) The Role of Nuclear Weapons 
  The military and political role of nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War era has 
decreased considerably because the United States and the Soviet Union or the Russian 
Federation have agreed to a substantial reduction of their nuclear forces. They agreed 
to reduce their strategic nuclear warheads by 70 %, and withdraw their tactical nuclear 
weapons deployed mainly in the Central Europe. The reduction of the strategic nuclear 
weapons has a political meaning, while the withdrawal of the tactical nuclear weapons 
rather has a military meaning because they are supposed to be used in the early stage 
of a conflict between the East and the West. 
  We can confnm that the military and political role of nuclear weapons in the context 
of the East-West relations or the U.S.-Russia relations has significantly decreased 
because of the end of the Cold War. Indeed the meaning of nuclear weapons on a global
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level has decreased. But on a regional level, the meaning of nuclear weapons seems to 
be increasing. For example, the nuclear weapons of Israel in the Middle East and those 
of India and Pakistan in South Asia, and nuclear development of North Korea in the 
Korean peninsula and those in Iran or Libya show that nuclear weapons can play an 
important role in regional hegemony, and that the possibility of the use of nuclear 
weapons in regional conflicts is increasing. 
  The general trend of the increase in regional conflicts is one of the characteristics 
of the post-Cold War era, and also increases the possibility of the use of weapons of 
mass destruction, including nuclear weapons. 'Mis leads to the second characteristic 
of the post-Cold War, that is, the prolifération of weapons of mass destruction and 
missiles. It is urgent to prevent the spread of these weapons to regions with potential 
conflicts, because the role of nuclear weapons is decreasing on the global level, but 
increasing on the regional level.ll)
III A New International Security Order
  Strategic nuclear warheads will have been reduced to 3000-3500 in the beginning 
of the 21 st century if the START Treaties are implemented accordingly. As is clear 
from the U.S. statements atthe time of the signature of the START II Treaty, the number 
of 3500 was decided to keep deterrence in any circumstance. In this sense, the Treaty 
is still the result of the thinking during the Cold War. In the START II negotiation, the 
Russian Federation argued for a reduction to 2000 warheads. 
  It seems to me that the 3000-3500 warheads are too many in an age where the Cold 
War is over and no East-West confrontation exists. Although it will take time to destroy 
or dismantle nuclear systems already agreed to be reduced, the U.S. and Russia should 
negotiate further reductions, and the United Kingdom, France and China should join 
this process. As the military and political role of nuclear weapons among these Pive 
counties is decreasing, it will be possible to reduce their nuclear arsenal to 200 or so 
without waiting for the radical transformation f international structure.12) 
  However, as there exist potential or emerging nuclear states in spite of the fact the 
current NPT is supported by the great majority of the world, international society must
11) Ivo H. Daalder divides arms control into a cooperative approach in Europe and a competitive approach in 
   the Middle East, South Asia and Northeast Asia (Ivo H. Daalder, "The Future of Arms Control," Survival, 
   Vol.34, No.1, Spring 1992, pp.51-73.). 
12) Michael E. Brown, "The `End' of Nuclear Arms Control," Arnu Control, Vol.14, No.1, April 1993, p.63; 
   Ivo H. Daalder, "Stepping Down the Thermonuclear Ladder: How Long Can We Go?" Ibid, p.93.
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endeavor to prevent he spread of nuclear weapons. Currently both political and 
technical measures are taken, but technical measures like export control by supplier 
countries are valid in the short erm only. As the supply-side approach alone has its 
lirait, we should also take the demand-side approach into account and employ political 
measures.13) 
  Needed are the elimination of security concerns which demand nuclear weapons 
and to decrease the political meaning attached to nuclear weapons. For the former, 
concerned states hould make efforts to get rid of the underlying causes of regional 
disputes, and for the latter, the NWSs should stop the political use of nuclear weapons 
and reduce the size of nuclear weapons which in turn would indirectly reduce their 
military and political value. 14) 
  It is very urgent o go forward to a world without nuclear weapons through the 
reduction of nuclear weapons and the prevention of their prolifération. However, a 
world without nuclear weapons can not be achieved through efforts in disarmament 
alone. Improvement in international security depends not only on the progress of 
disarmament but also on the progress achieved in other fields.15) First, the international 
norm of no-use of force must be strengthened and more completely adhered. In the 
pots-Cold War era, armed conflicts have occurred in many areas of the world and illegal 
uses of forces are common in these circumstances. We have to secure the effectiveness 
of this fundamental rule of international law. In the case of nuclear weapons, which 
have not been used since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, we need a special law which clearly 
prohibits their use, even in the case of retaliation against he use of conventional 
weapons. 
  Secondly, we need a system which prevents a dispute from developing into a 
conflict, that is, a mechanism for peaceful settlements of international disputes, because 
the occurrence of disputes can not be avoided in international society. We must prepare 
a mechanism which provides greater availability to third-party dispute seulement 
through good offices, fact-finding, mediation, conciliation, arbitration or judicial set-
tlement. For the improvement and dissemination of these means, confidence-building 
among nations by a step-by-step approach is necessary.
13)
14)
15)
Chris Smith, "Nuclear Prolifération, the New World Order and the Widening North-South Divide," Inter-
nationale Spectator, Vol.46, No.11, November 1992, pp.657-663. 
Lawrence Scheinman, "The Non-Prolifération Treaty: On the Road to 1995," IAEA Bulletin, Vol.34, No.1, 
1/1992, pp.35-36; Carl Kaysen, Robert S. McNamara nd George W. Rathjens, "Nuclear Weapons after the 
Cold War," Foreign Affairs, Vol.70, No.4, Fall 1991, p.109. 
Jonathan Dean, "Comprehensive Control over Nuclear Weapons," Arras Control, Vol.14, No.1, April 1993, 
pp.250-251.
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  Thirdly, with the revival of the United Nations, it is necessary to improve the U.N. 
collective security function by adapting it to the new international order. 'Me U.N. 
Security Council has to pursue international interest rather than just the national 
interests of the permanent fives. It may be necessary to rethink the membership of the 
Security Council for that purpose. 
  Measures in these three areas and disarmament are interdependent, and the progress 
in one category would stimulate the progress in other areas. Recent remarkable 
progress in disarmament has had a positive influence on the other three categories. 
However, in order to realize a world without nuclear weapons, dramatic progress in 
those three categories is necessary and a structurally transformed society must be 
established. 
  In order to establish a new international security order, not only positive progress 
in disarmament but also a consolidation of the norm of no-use of force, a more available 
and efficient mechanism for the.peaceful seulement of disputes and a more effective 
collective security system are necessary. With progress in all these four interdependent 
factors, a more secure and peaceful world will be established. Nuclear disarmament is 
an indispensable part of this new international security order.
